The "THIRD WAY"


December15th 1998


The next issue, Number 31, will appear on January15th 1999.





It often happens that, on reflection, the best course of action that we might have taken in some past situation would have been a compromise between two extremes or, better still, a synthesis of two opposite possibilities. It is a fact of experience that we tend often to come to such a conclusion - after the event.

But it would be invalid to argue from many instances of this to infer that, when confronted by the need to decide, the sure way to arrive at the best decision is to 'average out' all the possibilities on offer. This 'averaging' is the doctrine of 'moderation in all things' - the now fashionable talk of 'the third way' can degenerate very easily into this.

The main thrust of this essay is that such doctrines are logically flawed and can be absurd.



It is not logically possible to infer an ABSOLUTE general rule from even a large number of particular instances - even though, paradoxically, we very often have to take gambles on doing just that.

Folk wisdom is illuminating - and folk wisdom is often self-contradictory; it recognises paradoxes. We often say that "experience is the best teacher" but we never say, should never say, "experience is our infallible teacher" because to do so would be to discount the contrary wisdom that "there is always a first time". (Strictly we cannot properly say "there is ALWAYS a first time" - it is safer to say "there might come a first time").

How can it be that induction - the attempted identification of absolute general rules from accumulated particular instances - is not truly dependable? Why can we not argue that, say, the earth goes round the sun and has done for millions of years therefore it will always do so? We have to take into account the possibility that, say, the earth's orbiting is slowing down very gradually and consequently all the accumulated slowing down may, one day, result in the earth simply lurching into, falling into, the sun. A great many small changes can accumulate into a big one and so the absolute general conclusion may not be dependable if the instances upon which it is based are not all quite the same.

Again, folk wisdom is more succinct than philosophical hard labour - "the last straw breaks the camel's back" says it all. It encapsulates the flaw in induction as a truly dependable procedure.

So, just because the moderate way, the 'third way', has often worked well it does not follow that the third way is the way to choose, on principle, in advance. The Bible - that supposed source of all wisdom and virtue - does not help us much when we are confronted by an aggressor. Do we try to "turn the other cheek" or do we try to exact "an eye for an eye ..."? But, in fairness, it must be said that the Bible does not tell us, as some flimsy politicians might tell us, that there is a third or middle way between these extremes even though, in the event, things might actually work out that way.

It is easy to expose the third way as simply no basis for decision - even if it is a summary of much experience. It is easy to subject moderation, per se, to reductio ad absurdum.

Let us suppose that it is universally agreed that murder should be, unconditionally, a capital offence. There will be some relatively liberal people who support capital punishment on condition that it is administered humanely. There will be other 'hard-line' people who think that murder is so evil that the convicted murderer should be subjected to twelve hours excruciating torture before, finally, being executed. Such people would, presumably, argue that simply executing murderers is not a sufficient deterrent to murder ....

What a chance for the moderate, third way, enthusiasts!

We might expect them to advocate a tariff of torture severity ranging from inflicting mere discomfort to the inflicting of the most horrible agony - depending upon how atrocious a given murder is thought to be .... we could have 'guidelines' and a Torture Board to advise the Home Secretary of the day as to how to proceed.

This fantasy illustrates the essential weakness of the 'moderation at any price' position - it depends upon the very thing it objects to; moderates need extremists to tell them what to be moderate about.

There is no avoidance of the need generally to think afresh and, perhaps only on rare occasions, when confronted by the need to decide, to decide upon extreme action.





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