ON RIGHTS
15th February 2003
Active rights and passive rights
There is a distinction that is made by many rights activists at the present time. A contrast is made between a right possessed unknown to the possessor (a passive right) and one known to the possessor (an active right). For example animals' rights are passive - the animals do not know that they have the humanly perceived rights; the ethical content of our relations with animals resides in our perceived duties to them. But my right to publish my ideas on the internet is an active right - I know that I have it. My ISP (Internet Service Provider) has accepted a duty to enable me to exercise that right and I may be said to a have duty not to harm his reputation by publishing highly objectionable material through his good offices.
It seems that 'right' and 'duty' are related and the idea of 'passive right' is redundant. When we say that a relationship is subject to passive right then all we are saying is that the duty element predominates in that relationship. In the rest of this essay we shall be considering only rights and duties and not make use of the concept of passive right.
Right and agency
An agent is here defined as a being who can take action To say that someone is a 'free agent', in such and such regard, is to say that the person is equally free to act in a particular way or to not so act - has the right to, and the right not, to act in that way.
To be effective, it is necessary that the agent is aware of having the right and being able to exercise it without penalty. A desired right may not exist but can be claimed at the claimant's discretion and perhaps risk.
Avoiding Naivety
It is not always understood clearly that to have a right does not merely require duty as to its possible exercise but moreover, necessarily, puts the potential agent at risk of being pressed to exercise it, or to not exercise it, by excessive persuasion or force exerted by other parties. It is these latter possibilities and that make a naive exposition of rights particularly misleading in some cases.
Examples of Naivety
I claim (and indeed have) a right to fore gather with like people to consider joint action or ideas within the law. This right to free assembly entails a duty to not practise mutual intimidation or to plan or procure the intimidation of others. The mere fact of assembly entails opportunity to intimidate more than an isolated individual can attempt unaided. This happens in some 'show of hands' meetings and is intended to be obviated by secret ballot.
I claim (and indeed have) a right to send letters to the editor for intended publication. I accept the duty to refrain from needless offence, verbosity and factual error. The editor has a duty to consider my letters and a right to decide whether or not to publish any of them. My right and his would both be subverted by intimidation on either side and we both have a duty to refrain from intimidatory attitudes and actions regarding the correspondence. The mere fact of having the right to write to the editor provides opportunity for intimidation as does the mere fact of the editor's right to refuse publication.
I claim (and have) the right to vote secretly in public ballots and it is everybody's duty to avoid being intimidatory in this matter. Cases of, for example, intimidation by 'white supremacists'. to not vote have been reported among black Americans. Intimidation by partners or parents in respect of whom to vote for are well known to have happened - and are equally unacceptable. The mere fact of having the right to vote provides opportunity for intimidation as to its exercise.
A pregnant woman may claim the right to abortion and although this is not a formal right in most countries it is generally a de facto right. But even supposing there to be a formal right it is simplistic to believe that the woman really has perfectly free choice. Practically she may be under intense family pressure to decide, one way or the other, against her will. To possess a right is one thing; to be able freely to enforce it is quite another.
A person in terminal distress may claim the right to a procured death (procured by lethal injection or by 'constructive neglect' seems to me to be ethical nit-picking) and although this is not a formal right in most countries it is generally a de facto right. But even supposing there to be a formal right, it is simplistic to believe that the afflicted person can have an absolutely free right, one way or the other. The possibilities of family pressure ....... "why doesn't grandma ask to die?" ..... are very disturbing.
The fact is that rights are open to abuse either on the part of the bearers of the rights or on the part of other people capable of exerting pressure. While it is naive to pretend that the possession of a right does not leave the way open to abuse it is even more naive to pretend that such an opening must lead to abuse and that hence the right is one that ought not to be allowed.
It seems to me that such rights as those of assembly, and publication, abortion and euthanasia are very valuable and that abuse arguments are not finally countervailing. That much is good sound secular humanism.
Christians, being persuaded that we are steeped in Original Sin, might lapse into saying that everything we can do is open to our abuse and that hence we should do nothing. Only weird hermits have acted on the principle that the less you do the less harm you do. Mainstream Christians and secular humanists can be at one on the general terms of the rights/duties question even though they might dispute particular rights and the very origin of rights themselves.
Religious opinion is notoriously divided on what rights ought to be or ought not to be. The Will of God often turns out to the Whim of the Godly.