INTRODUCTION
We are told very frequently that we must turn to, or go back to, the ethics of Jesus.
Many people are sceptical about some of the more extraordinary Christian claims -
the the one-day creation, seven days creation, the snake/apple tale, the whole sequence
of seemingly tall stories up to and including the virgin birth and bodily resurrection
- but many of these very same people nonetheless say that, somehow, we have to put
up with all these weird suppositions because of the supreme value of the ethical
teachings attributed to Jesus. Such people are worried that the we might throw away the
baby with the bath water.
Quite irrespective of the authenticity of the gospels, in English, on our shelves
- ignoring the daunting problem emphasised by the compilers of the New English Bible
(the problem of "what to translate and how to translate it") - and also disregarding
the problem of 'what Jesus really meant' - this essay is a claim that the ethics attributed
to Jesus, in the words that we can actually read for ourselves, is, prima facie
NOT of special value - certainly not of such value as to be regarded as inspired
rather than merely, in some important ways, inspiring.
Of course, there is no straightforward compact ethical manifesto in the gospels;
statements of ethical significance are scattered throughout the synoptic gospels
in particular and so the charge of selective quotation can be made very easily -
a charge pithily summed up in the quip 'a text out of context is a pretext.'
It happens that the Scottish Council of Churches has run a course for church activists,
a course that includes a Christian Ethics module. In the course book is a list of
gospel references chosen by the compilers of the module, for students to study. Any
charge of 'out of context' selection should be referred to the SCC, not to me, the
writer of this essay. What follows is a complete list of those references or groups
of related references. The SCC writer is at pains to say that other ethically significant
texts could have been cited and so I have added to the list the famous and very important one about the widow's mite.
Thanks are due to the SCC and to that writer for compiling that list.
COMMENTS UPON THESE TEACHINGS
It is easiest to comment upon these in the above order, the order in which the SCC
writer set them out. Having done that then a summing-up can be attempted. However,
before commenting on the texts listed by the SCC. it seems that the story of the
widow's mite ought to be considered (MARK 12 : 41-44).
This story is important because it raises a classic ethical dilemma - the relative
importance of intention and consequences.
If we take intention as the main consideration then the widow comes out of it very
well; she has meant well and done the best she could do and it is, presumably, not
her fault that she could not do more. But, on the other hand, the little that she
gave would not be of very much use to anyone precisely because it was so little. She might
have felt good (with some reason) but she scarcely did much good.
The rich donor may well have done much more good than the widow but would have, truly,
less reason to feel good because he had made no real sacrifice of his self-interest.
But the widow, by giving her all, had made herself totally dependent upon other people
while the rich man left himself still in a position to help others.
It has to hoped that both, in their different ways, did good by good example but,
of course, this spin-off would be lost if the giving were done in secret.
The fact is that intentions and consequences both make claims upon our capacity for
moral approval and it is merely shallow to extol the one at the expense of totally
denigrating the other. The story makes no attempt to discuss the problem; it simply
resorts to slogan ethics of a kind that could well discourage people from giving anything
short of their all.
It might also be wondered whether the rich man had perhaps made his money partly for
the express purpose of spending some of it charitably; it can be wondered whether
the widow was poor because of fecklessness and her giving her little all was simply
to draw attention to her virtue and elicit gifts on account of that. Her gift may not have
been well-meaning at all; it might have been the last sprat to catch the next mackerel.
The fact is that consequences can be, to some extent, assessed while intentions
can only be attributed. The story is a very flimsy one in that it fails to address
any of the complex issues involved other than willingness to sacrifice one's immediate
interests.
1. MAT 5: 10-11; 38-39; 41-42.
Verses 10-11 seem reasonable enough but, ethically, not particularly noble; Jesus
appears to be offering full support to those who agree with him. Crudely speaking,
this boils down to 'if you scratch my back ... ' This is certainly sensible and fair
but scarcely a very noble ethic. A more elevated sentiment might, equally crudely, be -
'I will scratch your back even if you do not scratch mine'. In fairness it must be
said that the well-known 'love your enemies ... ' text improves upon the rather
lame ethic of making a great virtue of mutual back-scratching.
Verses 38-39 taken together are very unconvincing. While it is true that the OT teaching
(quoted in verse 38) of 'an eye for an eye ...' would, as someone said wittily, simply
lead us to a blind and toothless world, it could also be said that, our following the teaching of verse 39, would simply lead us to a world of very sore cheeks for
everyone except the bullies.
The hard truth is that this problem (of what peaceable people ought to do in face
of belligerent ones) admits of no simple general solution. All that the Bible does,
referring both to the OT and to these two verses, is to offer two answers - revenge
or appeasement - neither of which, in the light of experience, can be said to be satisfactory.
Verses 41-42 border on to the farcical: if I give, or lend, on demand then having
done so I can then, by the same principle, demand to be given back that which I
have just given and I can demand to be lent back that which I have just lent. The
absurdity of this is expressed by pantomime dialogues of the kind - 'After you Claud.', 'No,
after you Cecil.'
More seriously, verse 42 effectively countermands the gist of the eighth commandment
"Thou shalt not steal" in that it boils down to saying that it is ethically obligatory
to be a willing accessory to someone else's theft (from oneself).
One of the other texts refers to a man taking one's cloak and, following verse 42,
one can take it back again. The ludicrous spectacle of two men passing a cloak back
and forth from one to the other, in a busy street perhaps, simply blows the mind.
Such idiocy would surely attract the attention of those strong gentle chaps in white coats
who are always ready to take us to a secure place where our bizarre behaviour will
not be a danger to ourselves or to others.
2. LUKE 11: 37-54; 2: 1-3. MAT 18: 15.
LUKE 11: 37-54 tells of a most extraordinary outburst from Jesus - an outburst which
people who tend to admire him must surely hope has been misreported.
On coming unwashed to a meal and this ill-mannered omission having been noticed, Jesus,
rather than feeling awkward as most of us would, proceeds to lambast his host with
a lecture about things quite other than the simple cleanliness of the person.
Jesus here, if the report is correct, reminds us of those pitiful and insecure young
people who flout convention merely to prove - with the minimum of grace and the
maximum of ostentation - that they are not its slaves. We have all met young men
whose message appears to be 'good manners can be a sham; we are deliberately rude in order
to show that we are not shamming'. Such young men usually grow up to be super-conformists.
One can only guess what Jesus would have come to be like had he achieved mellow middle-age. If these verses are supposed to set us an example then one shudders to
think what a cautionary tale would be like!
Perhaps there is something of value in the tale; the politeness and patience reported
of the hosts is perhaps meant to exemplify 'turning the other cheek'? Or perhaps,
considering the last few verses, we are to be put in mind of 'just because I am paranoid does not mean that they are not out to get me'.
The whole passage is most unedifying and offers little or no ethical guidance.
LUKE 2: 1-3 seems to have no ethical point whatever; it is a statement purporting
to be of historical fact.
MAT 18:15 seems to be good sense and good ethics - those of us who live in small close-knit
communities ought to understand that it is wrong to gossip about people's failings
behind their backs rather than to confront them in private with a view to some resolution.
3. LUKE 12: 15-21. MAT 5:42; 6 19-24
LUKE 12: 15-21 and MAT:6 19-24 are very similar and can be considered together; comment
on MAT 5: 42 has already been made.
The advice in the verses from Luke is perfectly proper and wise but, what is said
in the following verses 22-23 does not follow logically from what is reasonably put
in the preceding ones. It simply does not follow that the wrong of accumulating wealth
for one's own selfish satisfaction makes the accumulation of wealth for other reasons
necessarily wrong as well. Oxfam, for example, properly accumulates wealth from sales,
and fund-raising generally, for the purpose of relieving undeserved hunger in countries less fortunate than our own.
"Take no thought for your life" is simply silly; if you are to do good to others
then your first need is to be alive to do it; if one's life is to be in the service
of others then it has, in general, to be "heeded". You're no good dead; you are less
than no good if you so neglect yourself that that so far from helping others, you desperately
need help yourself. What do you achieve by going to a famine-stricken country to
help the starving if you starve yourself? You will then be useless to others and
a drain upon the limited aid resources that were meant for people who couldn't help being
starved.
The passage gives no proper account of the classic difficulty of balancing egoism
with altruism - one of the great ethical challenges we actually have to face.
The only rational basis for not preparing sensibly for the future would be if the
all-transforming Second Coming were imminent. Jesus is reported as asserting this
to be imminent; his being mistaken about it - even after nearly two thousand years
- makes ethical teaching in anticipation of such a huge event merely ridiculous and its perpetuation
irresponsible.
The verses from Matthew 6 are even less sensible in that they include the extraordinary
statement that you "cannot serve two masters". Of course you can, provided that
the two masters do not make incompatible demands upon you and that you have a sense
of priority as between them. Indeed, Jesus is elsewhere reported precisely as making
this very point when he asks us to serve two masters - "render unto Caesar ..." and
"render unto God ..." on the implied understanding that the two acts of service are
both quite proper so long as priority is given to the more important one - the second one,
presumably.
One of the main ethical problems we actually have to face is the problem of divided
loyalties, competing duties, and how to prioritise them. Verse 24 does not help
us with this difficulty; it tacitly ignores the problem altogether. It is merely
'slogan ethics' casting no very useful light upon an age-old ethical dilemma.
4. MAT 6: 1-4.
Again, this text starts by being perfectly good ethics - do not boast about your good
actions.
But superficiality takes over almost at once in that the only offered alternative
to boasting about one's goodness is to be secretive about it.
Even supposing secrecy to be possible, it is wrong to be secretive about one's goodness
- such as it is. Everybody knows that good example is about the most powerful means
there is for making the world a better place and a the notion of a good example that is kept secret is an elementary logical contradiction.
The value of good example is particularly important in the upbringing of children;
is it not the case that the best thing, ethically, that we can do for our children,
or our pupils, is to set good examples? Goodness, as the old saying goes, is mostly
'caught not taught'. To be secretive about one's good acts is to prevent one's goodness,
such as it may be, from being caught by others. As has been said already, the very
point of the widow's mite story is that it applauds good example.
5. MAT 22: 34-40. JOHN 4: 19-21.
"Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" is one of the noblest thoughts in the reported
ethics of Jesus but it is not original; it is the almost universally recognised Golden
Rule which was recognised and formulated centuries before Jesus and is in no way necessarily dependent upon the preceding commandment "Thou shalt love thy God ..."
Many early formulations of the Golden Rule were made by godless thinkers such as Confucius
and others and is still observed by many contemporary sceptics. Jesus was right about
it but we do not owe the precept to him especially.
In any case the precept "love thy neighbour as thyself" needs to be applied positively;
there is a trend within Christianity to think so poorly of oneself, as a miserable
sinner, that to "love thy neighbour as thyself" often boils down to "despise or even hate thy neighbour as thyself" - although admittedly only a few Christians nowadays
think that way.
6. LUKE 10: 25-37.
The story of the Good Samaritan is another of the noblest parts of the Christian scripture
and, in so far as it effectively says that everyone is our neighbour it is very much
in line with the passage in the OT that bids us not to vex aliens because we may be aliens ourselves if we move among other different people.
There is little doubt that if the Golden Rule and the story of the Good Samaritan
were taken to heart by more of us then our world would be a far better one.
7. MAT 25: 31-46.
This is sound ethics except for the huge emphasis upon punishment if we do wrong.
If we do right for fear of being punished then we are not only acting ethically but
also expediently. The implication of this is the ethically unsound idea that 'if
you cannot be good be careful'. The other old saying - that 'virtue is its own reward' - while
a little optimistic, is at least sound ethics untainted by expediency.
8. MAT 5: 17-20; 21-26; 27-28
Verses 17-26 represent recognisably good ethical sense but 27-28 (which were not included
in the SCC list but which are referred to in other parts of the course book) are
of very dubious merit.
These two verses seem, somewhat vaguely, to present lustful thoughts and lustful acts
as being somehow ethically equivalent. That is not said in so many words but the
impression remains that the gospel is suggesting as much.
Ethically speaking, the passage is pitifully weak for, while the thought and the act
can both be considered to be wrong, the act is by far the worse of the two - for
a very obvious reason. The lustful thought does not hurt the person who is the subject
of that thought; indeed that person need not even know that the thought is being entertained,
may not even have heard of the thinker. (How many men have lustful thoughts about,
say, a female film star who has not even met any of those men and would not recognise them if she did; their thoughts, wrong though they may be, do not hurt her one
little bit. How often do men entertain lustful thoughts about the female characters
in a work of fiction - imaginary women who are not even there to be hurt?
The lustful act, on the other hand, may cause immense hurt to the victim - ranging
from humiliating embarrassment to permanent physical or psychological injury.
The only way to even begin to regard the thought and the act as being to any degree
equivalent is to suppose that what the victim of the act experiences is of no moral
interest. Admittedly consequences may not be all there is to ethics but an ethic
that simply ignores real consequences to real people is no ethic at all. These two verses
seem to be ethically appalling, if only by omission of any mention of consequences.
A (female!) minister of the Kirk, discussing these verses with me, suggested that
the thought and the act were equally offensive to God. The obvious reply to that
is that if God thinks along those lines then He is not a morally laudable god, is
he?
9. LUKE 6: 37-38.
These verses make sense to everyone but few people actually live by them. They are
idealistic rather than effective in the real world.
10. MAT 6: 1. ROM 12: 9-21.
It is simply a fact that good is often unrewarded in this world; it is wishful believing
to suppose that somehow things are put right in the next life. It is comforting to
believe this but that does not constitute evidence that it is actually true.
11. MAT 18: 1-9; 21: 28-32; 23: 12.
Noble sentiments that nobody, not even Christians, take very seriously. In any case
to seek to occupy a position of power and authority can be a means of doing good
- "power tends to corrupt .... and almost all great men are bad men" is a famous
saying of Lord Acton's and, while it is often true, it does not have always to be true. There
can be such a thing as eminence with goodness and it is simply foolish to deny the
possibility. This is as silly as saying (as referred to earlier) that the accumulation
of wealth is necessarily a selfish act; it can be accumulated for good cause and indeed
the Christian church defends its acquisition of worldly wealth precisely on that
basis - and often, to be fair, uses that wealth virtuously.
Once again, in the gospels, a promising idea is ruined by glib superficiality, a dangerous
tendency to over-simplify issues that are easily recognised to be not simple at all.
12. MK 7: 9-13; 10: 1-12. LUKE 8: 19-21; 12: 49-53.
The Scottish Council of Churches course book says it all - "NB Jesus makes far more
negative comments about the family than positive ones".
A most disturbing tendency among the disenchanted youth of the bored middle class
is to drift into cults which make a virtue of disloyalty to one's family. This self-indulgence
is a nasty over reaction to the commandment that tells us to honour our mother and our father without allowing for the possibility that parents can be, and indeed
in some case are, despicable by any standards biblical or otherwise.
Yet again a genuine ethical difficulty - how to identify the proper limits of family
loyalty - is fouled up by unthinking biblical extremism one way or the other. No
wonder Christians are worried about the family - it is their ethical superficiality
that has helped to create a problem that is not always evident in societies without a major
Christian input.
13. MAT 5: 33-37.
The prohibition of oath-taking is entirely proper; many people, including both those
in the Quaker fringe of religion and the outright sceptics, have fought long and
hard to be relieved of this demeaning nonsense in courts of law.
14. MAT 22: 15-22. (But see ROM 13: 1-6 NEB E.S.)
The distinction between "... to God" and " ... to Caesar" is very proper. For a believer
it is simply a literal ethical truth and to the sceptic it is a valid metaphor. Governments
do not like us to make the distinction and Paul, (ROM 13: 1-6) makes clear his rejection of the distinction preferring the creeps' creed that governments are
by God ordained and that to defy them is to defy God.
Paul's position is ultimately atheist - if the government's word is authentically
god-warranted then we do not need to refer to God at all. If ROMANS 13: 1-6 is anything
to go by then Paul would have sat well on the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union in its most repressive mode. Fortunately many courageous people,
believers and sceptics alike, try to keep the principle of the God/Caesar distinction
in mind and they find the resulting dilemmas hard to resolve sometimes.
Again, the biblical messages are ethically confused but at least, as in the case of
'the eye for an eye' and the 'other cheek' problem, the issue is raised.
15. MK 2: 27.
Fairly obvious idea; very few people would deny it.
16. MK 9: 42.
Noble sentiments; no other comment!
17. MAT 6: 25-34.
All the 'take no thought for the morrow' idea is senseless and irresponsible except
in the hope of an imminent world-transforming Second Coming.
17. MAT 6: 25-34.
This is the ultimate 'thought for the weak' - don't use the brains that God has given
you in an attempt to identify practically what to do for the best - just believe
and all will be well.
CONCLUSIONS
Summing-up, it seems fair to say that the ethical teachings, attributed to Jesus in
the English language versions of the gospels to which we have ready access, is not
ethical teaching of a very high quality. Some of it is unreal, some of it is irrelevant, if not actually unethical, in a world not yet in benefit of the predicted Second
Coming; some of it is dismissive of the dignity of the person and there are significant
omissions - omissions of some matters that, intuitively, we see to be ethically important. Those precepts that are truly laudable are, in some cases, unoriginal and have
been expressed better by earlier thinkers independently of any Judeo-Christian input.
One has to say, with regret, that had these precepts, biblically attributed to Jesus,
appeared anywhere other than in a book that is seen as privileged literature, they
would be regarded as of second-rate quality ... by which is meant second rate not
first-rate or tenth-rate.
A tutor in moral philosophy who had received such work from one of his students would
probably send it back with a comment such as 'you have provided a list of many of
the matters that are of ethical concern but you have omitted others seemingly for
no good reason and the topics you have dealt with you have not thought through with sufficient
rigour. Try again.'
If this is an even remotely fair criticism of the biblically-reported ethics of Jesus
then it might be argued that perhaps important other material of his has been lost
and that the surviving fragments are not a fair account of what he really taught.
Be that as it may, we can do nothing about what may have been irretrievably lost.
Another possible way out of any unease we may feel about the gospel-reported ethic
is to refer to other sources of Christian ethics in the hope of getting a more satisfactory
result. Two such spring to mind - the Decalogue and the list of the Seven Deadly Sins.
The Decalogue, while including so much that is ethically valuable, is almost incredible
in its omissions and its lack of sense of proportion. For example, given that we
are forbidden to make graven images but that there is no commandment against gross
violence, short of killing, against the person then we have the following ethically
absurd possibility:
I may be a sculptor or a painter and I may pay my neighbour's wife to pose as a nude
model; she agrees to do so and her husband has no objection - she has been a professional
model for many years. Considering the Decalogue, I am in direct defiance of the second commandment. (Some adherents to the OT are very strictly against representational
art precisely because of this commandment).
But, taking another scenario, I and two others invade my neighbours' home, beat her
and her husband severely.. Neither of them is killed but they both suffer appalling
trauma and loss of dignity. There is no prohibition of violence in the decalogue
- only a prohibition of killing (which may even be justifiable in self-defence).
It is absurd to regard the Decalogue as a balanced ethical code of dependable relevance
to real life even though some of its requirements are ethically valuable.
The lack of balance is horrifying: to forbid killing but to ignore torture, to demand
honour to parents but to say nothing against ill-treatment of children, to condemn
outright the sometimes technical offence of adultery but to make no mention of the
very real offence of rape . . . these are absurd and horrible distortions of ethics as
civilised people understand the term. Are the Seven Dealy Sins any better as balanced
list of ethical requirements?
The Seven Deadly Sins - in no particular order - are wrath, avarice, sloth, pride,
lust, envy and gluttony (I remember the list by way of WASP LEG). Superficially these
seem to be a pretty comprehensive catalogue of real wrongs - until we notice that
there is no mention of other equally real wrongs. The seven include no reference to the
obvious sins of dishonesty and its relatives such as treachery, deception, broken
promises and no reference whatever to personal violence of any sort such as torture,
physical abuse of the vulnerable, unlawful forcible incarceration and so on.
It is clear that, like the Ten, the Seven, represent no balanced ethical precept in
general any more than does the reported ethics of Jesus. If we are serious about
right and wrong then we have to look further than traditional religious sources.